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Government’s Diminishing Benefits from Inflation
 
B Y  J E F F R E Y  R O G E R S  H U M M E L  
For millennia governments have resorted to expanding the money stock, either through coinage debasement or fiat money, to finance 
their expenditures. This expedient, with its resulting 
price inflation, has occurred most noticeably during 
wars. And the Zimbabwe hyperinflation of 2007–08, 
the second worst in world history, peaking at a rate of 
way as an undetected counterfeiter. Simple fiat money, 
such as the Continentals issued during the American 
Revolution or the Greenbacks and Confederate cur­
rency issued during the Civil War, is easiest to under­
stand. It is directly spent to cover government 
purchases, and the resulting increase in prices over 
what they otherwise would have been reduces the pur­
79.6 billion percent per month, 
reminds us that monetary expansion 
remains an option for desperate gov­
ernments in poor countries—even 
during peacetime. 
For wealthy developed countries, 
however, inflation over the last few 
decades has in fact become a trivial 
source of government revenue. This 
outcome stems not merely from the 
worldwide decline in inflation rates 
that began in the 1980s. That disinfla­
tion was as much an effect of the way 
sophisticated financial systems now 
prevent governments from gaining 
Most libertarians have 
overlooked the fact 
that sophisticated 
financial systems now 
prevent governments 
from gaining much 
revenue from severe 
inflation. 
chasing power of money held by the 
general public. The government gains 
by exactly the same amount the pub­
lic loses in this implicit tax on real 
cash balances. Economists have digni­
fied this implicit tax with the term 
seigniorage. 
Currently nearly all fiat money is 
instead issued by central banks, such as 
the Federal Reserve. This arrange­
ment makes seigniorage a bit more 
complicated, sometimes requiring a 
well-taught course in economics to 
comprehend it, but the final result is 
identical. One arm of the govern-
much revenue from even severe inflation as it was a 
cause of falling inflation revenue. Yet most libertarians 
have overlooked this crucial development in the 
dynamics of government finance. They anachronisti­
cally harp on how the U.S. or European governments 
might cover significant fiscal shortfalls with the printing 
press, completely oblivious to how insignificant for 
such governments this hidden tax has become. 
Governments can potentially gain revenue from 
inflation in three ways. The first is the most obvious 
and the one most emphasized by libertarians: By issu­
ing fiat money the government benefits in the same 
ment, the central bank, creates fiat money and lends it 
to another arm of the government, the Treasury, which 
then spends it, in a process known as monetizing the 
debt. Legally the Fed cannot purchase securities from 
the U.S. Treasury directly, and must buy them on the 
open market from private holders, but that makes 
absolutely no difference since, in either case, more of 
the government’s deficit has been financed by new 
issues of fiat money. 
Jeffrey Rogers Hummel (jeff@jrhummel.com) is an associate professor of 
economics at San Jose State University. He thanks Less Antman, David 
Henderson, and Warren Gibson for their useful comments and suggestions. 
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Monetary cranks often attach undue importance to 
the fact that the Treasury pays interest to the central 
bank for these loans. Admittedly, interest earnings cover 
the operating expenses of the Fed, which therefore 
never has to go to Congress for an appropriation, and 
the precise incentives faced by these two separate arms 
of the government may differ. But the Fed ultimately 
rebates most of its interest earnings back to the Treasury 
(in 2008, for instance, $35.5 billion out of $41.0 billion, 
or 86 percent). If you consolidate the balance sheets of 
the central bank and the Treasury, the process looks 
exactly like simple fiat money. Even when much of the 
money the central bank creates is lent to private banks, 
as during World War I, or purchases private securities, as 
has been happening recently, the interest rebate to the 
Treasury still indirectly generates the same seigniorage 
higher tax brackets even if their real incomes remain 
constant. The U.S. government thus enjoyed automatic 
tax hikes requiring not one iota of change in the tax 
code throughout the 1970s. Under President Ronald 
Reagan the income tax brackets were indexed, but 
bracket creep continues with the alternative minimum 
tax. Moreover, indexing does not eliminate inflation’s 
tax on saving, both through the personal income and 
capital gains taxes. When interest rates rise to offset 
expected inflation, the tax rate applies to the higher 
nominal returns, which represent just inflation’s “phan­
tom gains,” to borrow a phrase from David Henderson. 
Real returns quite likely remain constant. These tax 
interactions, along with seigniorage and real debt 
reduction, not only bring about transfers from the pub­
lic to government, they also distort the economy’s per-
as a direct purchase of Treasury secu­
rities. The new fiat money flowing 
into the private sector simply releases 
money held by others to purchase 
Treasuries. 
Declining Purchasing Power 
The second way that government can gain from inflation relates to 
transfers between debtors and credi­
tors. If inflation is totally unantici­
pated or unexpectedly high, interest 





gains banks generate 
remain in the 
economy. 
formance, creating what economists 
call deadweight loss, additional losses 
to the general public that exceed any 
gains. But we are focusing here just on 
gains to government. 
Fractional Reserve 
Each of these three potential sources of inflation revenue has 
become attenuated in developed 
countries. The main factor impairing 
the first, seigniorage, is fractional 
reserve banking. Banks, as pr ivate 
compensate for the decline in the 
purchasing power of any loans. Net debtors gain, and 
net creditors lose. Government is, of course, the econ­
omy’s biggest debtor. Unanticipated inflation therefore 
reduces the real value of government debt. During the 
Great Inflation of the 1970s private investors holding 
long-term U.S. Treasury securities actually earned neg­
ative real returns despite receiving positive nominal 
interest. As a consequence, from 1946 to 1982, while 
the nominal debt that the U.S. government owed to the 
general public rose from $242 billion to $925 billion, 
that debt in 1946 dollars had actually fallen to $201 
billion. 
The third way that government can gain from infla­
tion stems from interaction with explicit taxes. Under a 
progressive income tax, inflation pushes people into 
institutions that increase the money 
stock, can magnify inflation but do not generate 
seigniorage. To the extent that bank-created money 
causes any inflationary fall in real cash balances, the off­
setting gains remain within the economy, accruing to 
the banks themselves or, absent monopoly privileges, 
flowing back via competition to their customers. The 
government doesn’t just fail to realize any seigniorage, 
its ability to do so is diminished. We can visualize why 
by comparing an economy in which banks hold 100 
percent reserves—in which every $10 in circulation is 
backed by $10 of government-issued fiat money—to an 
economy with fractional reserves—in which every $10 
in circulation is backed up by only $1 dollar of fiat 
money. Now assume a $100 billion increase in the total 
money stock. With 100 percent reserves, government 
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fiat money (also called the monetary base) increases by 
the full $100 billion, all of which constitutes seignior­
age. With the 10-to-1 ratio, in contrast, the same 
increase in the money stock is driven by only a $10 bil­
lion increase in the fiat base, so seigniorage is only one-
tenth as much. Nonetheless, in both cases, the $100 
billion increase in the total money stock sets off the 
same price inflation. 
In other words, the lower the reserve ratio in a frac­
tional reserve banking system, the less seigniorage gov­
ernment gets from a given increase in the price level. 
Or what amounts to the same thing, the greater will be 
the inflation cost of any given amount of real seignior­
age. Fractional reserve banking in effect lowers the 
demand for government-created base 
money, reducing the seigniorage tax 
base (that is, the public’s real holdings 
of non-interest-paying base money). 
Public Choice and Seigniorage 
This threat to seigniorage provided a major Public Choice motiva­
tion for the myriad government regu­
lations of banking in the past, from 
the imposition of reserve require­
ments to the creation of central banks 
with a monopoly on the issue of bank 
notes, all of which helped hold up the 
demand for government base money. 
The financial innovations and regula­
tory changes of the last several 
decades, however, have all but swept away most of these 
constraints on bank-created money. 
Outside of America’s two hyperinflations (during 
the Revolution and under the Confederacy during the 
Civil War), seigniorage in this country peaked during 
the Civil War under the Union, when it covered about 
15 percent of the war’s cost. By World War II seignior­
age was financing only a little over 6 percent of gov­
ernment outlays, which amounted to about 3 percent 
of gross domestic product (GDP). During the Great 
Inflation of the 1970s seigniorage was below 2 percent 
of federal expenditures, or less than half a percent of 
GDP. Consider today how little of your own cash bal­
ances is in the form of government-issued Federal 
Eliminating most 
reserve requirements 
and paying interest 
on the rest have 
mostly eliminated 
the government’s 
ability to simply 
print money to 
pay its debts. 
Reserve notes and Treasury coin rather than in the 
form of privately created bank deposits and money 
market funds. Prior to the recent financial crisis, M2 (a 
broad measure of the money stock that includes all 
checking accounts, savings and small-time deposits, and 
retail money market funds) was more than eight times 
the size of the monetary base. 
Partly that is because reserve requirements (which 
should not be confused with government-imposed 
capital requirements) became virtually a dead letter in 
the 1990s. Many countries, including Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, abol­
ished them outright. In the United States the Fed 
eliminated all reserve requirements on the forms of 
money M2 adds to M1 (a narrower 
measure of the money stock that 
includes only currency in circulation 
and certain checking accounts) and 
permitted banks to freely sweep cus­
tomers’ money between M1 checking 
accounts and M2 accounts. Congress 
has further more given the Fed 
authority to abolish the remaining 
reserve requirements on M1 in 2012. 
Conversion to Debt 
The Fed’s response to the finan­cial crisis has only accelerated 
these trends. It is true that in the 
three months after September 2008, 
the Fed doubled the monetary base, 
from $850 billion to $1.7 trillion, so that M1 now has 
over 100 percent reserves behind it. But the Fed 
simultaneously eliminated nearly all seigniorage from 
this unprecedented expansion of fiat money. It did so 
by starting to pay interest on bank reserves, something 
other major central banks, including the European 
Central Bank, were doing already. Essentially this 
converts any reserves that banks hold as deposit at 
the central bank into more government debt rather 
than proper fiat money. The Fed is now borrowing 
money from the banks and relending it to the Trea­
sury or private parties. This means that the only 
forms of money that still provide the U.S. government 
full seigniorage are currency in the hands of the gen­
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eral public and the actual cash held in bank vaults 
(which are a small part of a bank’s total reserves). 
And this new restraint on seigniorage will become 
tighter in the future as people replace currency with 
bank debit cards and other forms of electronic fund 
transfers. 
What about the other two ways that governments 
have benefited from inflation? The unexpected inflation 
of the 1970s, through its reduction of the real value of 
the national debt, actually generated about twice as 
much revenue for the U.S. government as did seignior­
age during the same period. That still is not a lot, and 
investors are much savvier these days. Globalization, 
with the corresponding relaxation of exchange controls 
in all major countries, allows them easily to flee to for­
eign currencies, with the result that 
changes in central-bank policy are 
almost immediately pr iced by 
exchange rates and interest rates. Add 
to this the ability to purchase from 
many governments securities that are 
indexed to inflation, and it becomes 
highly unlikely that investors will be 
caught off guard by anything less than 
sudden, catastrophic hyper inflation 
(defined as more than 50 percent per 
month)—and maybe even not then. 
All Pain, Little Gain 
monetary expansion, which no doubt contributed to 
inflation’s worldwide decline after 1980. Reid W. Click, 
in a study of 90 countries between 1971 and 1990, 
finds that average annual seigniorage exceeded 5 per­
cent of GDP in only eight countries: Egypt, Poland, 
Malta, Nicaragua, Argentina, Chile, Yugoslavia, and 
Israel. Almost none of the developed countries could 
boast seigniorage amounting to more than 1 percent of 
GDP, despite the fact that the study incorporated the 
inflationary years of the 1970s. Joseph H. Haslag’s 
smaller sample of 67 countries over a longer period, 
1965 to 1994, finds that seigniorage averaged about 2 
percent of total output for the entire sample, ranging 
from as low as 0.25 percent to as high as 9.98 percent 
(for Ghana). And Stanley Fischer puts the average 
Inflation’s interaction 
with explicit taxes 
definitely hurts 
taxpayers and the 
economy, but doesn’t 
help the government 
much. 
As for inflation’s interaction with explicit taxes, while it definitely hurts taxpayers and the econ­
omy, it seems not to have helped the U.S. government 
much. Since the Korean War, federal tax revenue has 
been bumping up against 20 percent of GDP. That is 
quite an astonishing statistic when you think about all 
the changes in the tax code over the intervening half­
century.Thus the Great Inflation had no obvious impact 
on explicit government revenues, even before the tax 
brackets were indexed. It would require a more com­
plex quantitative analysis that adjusted for changes in 
the tax code and in the economy to determine just how 
much periods of high inflation boosted the tax bite, but 
we can safely say that the effect was not dramatic. 
Because of all these factors combined, governments 
in developed countries have little incentive to resort to 
seigniorage of industr ial countr ies 
between 1973 and 1978, a period of 
high inflation, at 1.1 percent of gross 
national product. I know of no more 
recent studies, but with disinflation, 
the widespread paying of interest on 
bank reserves, and the consolidation 
of European countr ies under the 
European Central Bank, these aver­
ages should be lower for the period 
from 1990 to today. 
How Much Would It Take? 
By comparison, let us now run 
some numbers to estimate how much inflation might 
be needed to close the looming “fiscal imbalances” (as 
they are euphemistically styled) that face not merely the 
United States but most of the world’s welfare states.The 
2010 report of the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) projects that in 25 years some combination of 
spending cuts or tax increases equivalent to no less than 
12.3 percent of GDP will be needed to close the U.S. 
government’s fiscal gap. Assuming that revenues from 
explicit taxes remain capped at 20 percent of GDP, 
whether for structural or political reasons, and that 
politicians will have little incentive to cut spending, 
seigniorage will have to come up with the difference. 
Given that 10 percent inflation during the 1970s gener­
ated revenue amounting to 0.5 percent of GDP in the 
United States, a straight-line extrapolation suggests that 
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covering the growing fiscal shortfall would require 
more than a tripling of the price level, year after year 
after year.Within three years the dollar would be worth 
only about 2.5 percent of its original value. 
Such continual tr iple-digit inflation would be 
unprecedented, the highest the United States has ever 
experienced outside of its two hyperinflations. We 
admittedly have not included any short-term govern­
ment gains from a reduction in the real 
1970s was. Could central banks maybe cease paying 
interest on reserves and then reimpose or raise reserve 
requirements to generate more seigniorage at any given 
inflation rate? Although the answer is technically yes, 
the likelihood is slim indeed. Now that the genie is out 
of the bottle, any fiddling with reserve requirements (or 
other bank regulations) in a way that significantly 
increases seigniorage will destroy the banking industry 
as we know it. Think of reserve 
value of its debt, which biases our 
inflation estimate upward, but we also 
have not adjusted for the loss of 
seigniorage on interest-earning 
reserves, pushing the bias downward. 
Moreover, seigniorage itself faces its 
own Laffer curve (known as the Bailey 
curve, after the economist Martin Bai­
ley). To avoid higher taxes on their real 
cash balances, people spend money 
faster as inflation rises, thereby exacer­
bating the price increases. Higher rates 
of inflation thus generate proportion­
ally ever-smaller revenue increases. 
Financing the 
exploding 
government debt via 
inflation would 
require a tripling of 
prices, year after year 
after year. This is 
extremely unlikely. 
requirements as a tax on banks, 
requiring them to hold assets earning 
zero interest. The higher the require­
ment, the higher the tax rate. After 
ending interest on reserves, the Fed 
would have to multiply the current 
low reserve tax by a factor in the 
neighborhood of 15 or more, plus 
extend reserve requirements to 
money market funds, to make 
seigniorage truly lucrative. Given that 
the U.S. government has just engaged 
in a gigantic bailout of the banking 
system, I do not find this prospect 
Once we also acknowledge that the 
CBO’s projections are probably too optimistic, we can 
see why our estimate that financing the explosion in 
Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid payments will 
necessitate a 246 percent annual inflation is far too low. 
How likely is it that governments in the developed 
countries will be willing or even able to unleash such 
appalling currency depreciation? Recall how politically 
unpalatable the mere double-digit inflation of the 
probable. 
I am not denying that the future may bring higher 
inflation, if for no other reason than expectations of a 
fiscal crisis could start a flight from the dollar (or pound 
or euro) without any immediate change in central-bank 
actions. But the bottom line is that inflation’s implicit 
tax on real cash balances will no more be able to resolve 
the escalating budgetary problems of the welfare states 
than would an excise tax on chewing gum. 
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